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SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL WETLANDS: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PEACEFUL MIGRATION 
Lisa A. St. Amand* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The consensus of a growing number of climatologists is that in-
creasing concentrations of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse 
gases" in the atmosphere have committed the Earth to gradual global 
warming. 1 Researchers predict these higher temperatures will cause 
sea level to rise as a result of the melting of polar ice and the thermal 
expansion of ocean waters.2 Estimates of the extent of sea level rise 
over the next century range from one to seven feet. 3 As the sea 
rises, it will inundate a large percentage of existing coastal wetlands, 
which are composed of salt marshes, swamps, and shallow waters. 4 
These vulnerable coastal wetlands currently serve as nesting and 
feeding areas for waterfowl and other migrating birds, provide es-
sential habitat for shellfish, and contain vital nursery and spawning 
grounds for many commercially valuable fish. 5 Along gently sloping 
stretches of undeveloped coastline, wetlands conditions may be able 
• Attorney, Environmental Law Institute; J.D., Vermont Law School, 1983; B.A., Williams 
College, 1979. The author thanks research assistants Dan Berger and Steve Mattox. 
I Richard A. Houghton & George M. Woodwell, Global Climatic Change, SCI. AM., April 
1989, at 36, 36. 
2 Stephen Leatherman, Implications of Climatic Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS, 5, 5 (South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium 1990). 
3 James G. Titus, Greenhouse Effect and Coastal Wetland Policy: How the Americans 
Could Abandon an Area the Size of Massachusetts at Minimum Cost, ENVTL. MGMT. Nov.-
Dec. 1990, at 39, 40. 
4 See RALPH W. TINER, JR., FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (1984). 
5 Id. at 13-14. 
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to migrate landward as the sea rises, causing a gradual transition 
from upland6 to new wetland. 
In the United States, an expanding population in search of rec-
reation has subjected coastal property to the pressure of intense 
development, and many existing wetlands lie adjacent to upland 
areas that are or soon will be developed. As the sea rises, unre-
stricted owners of coastal property undoubtedly will seek to protect 
their investments through the use of seawalls, bulkheads, or similar 
constructions that are incompatible with wetlands migration. Pre-
servation of coastal wetlands ecosystems in these areas therefore 
will require a commitment by federal, state, and local governments. 
The uncertain dimensions of the threat that sea level rise poses 
to coastal wetlands, however, limit the options for anticipatory gov-
ernment action. There are three basic strategies that governmental 
entities could adopt in providing for wetlands migration: preventing 
development now in sensitive upland areas; allowing development 
now and deferring any government action until sea level rise reaches 
a critical stage; and allowing development now, but with restrictions 
that would require the relocation of humanly constructed structures 
as sea level rises. 7 
A government could pursue the first strategy through the exercise 
of eminent domain, preventing development by purchasing and pre-
serving critical uplands now. This solution, however, would require 
the government to buy lands that could be prohibitively expensive, 
and that ultimately may not be needed to accommodate wetlands 
migration. 8 Another option for implementing this strategy, simply 
prohibiting development in areas upland of existing coastal wetlands, 
likely would meet strong political opposition from development in-
terests, because it would take highly prized real-estate out of the 
market. 9 
Under the second strategy, a government would defer action until 
property became crucial for imminent wetlands migration. At this 
point, the government would purchase the property through exercise 
of eminent domain. This strategy of waiting, however, is expensive 
and entails the risk that property owners, who have not been pre-
pared adequately for such a transition, will seek to protect their 
property interests through political or legal action. 10 
6 The term "upland" as used in this article, refers to well-drained dry land adjacent to a 
wetland area. See id. at 2. 
7 Titus, supra note 3, at 44-45. 
8 Id. at 48. 
9 Id. at 54. 
10 Id. at 55. 
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The third strategy involves institutionalizing the presumption that 
humanly constructed structures will have to give way to migrating 
wetlands as sea level rises. 11 One example of this strategy in action 
would be a prohibition on the construction of bulkheads,12 thus re-
quiring the abandonment of buildings as water inundates upland 
areas and converts them to wetlands. 13 In another example, the 
government could purchase property through the exercise of emi-
nent domain and lease it back to the property owners for a term 
that would expire when sea level reached a critical stage. 14 The 
purchase price would be discounted SUbstantially, because possession 
would not vest in the government for decades. Under this concept 
of "presumed mobility,"15 the risks associated with sea level rise shift 
from wetlands ecosystems to property owners. Development can 
proceed, but the risk of abandonment becomes one of the forces 
shaping the market for coastal property. 16 
While the precise issue of coastal wetlands migration has not yet 
reached the agenda of many legislators, a number of states and 
municipalities have responded to other issues regarding coastal pro-
tection through creative land use initiatives. Private conservation 
efforts also have added to the inventory of protected coastal wet-
lands. 17 In addition, federal and state conservation endeavors in 
noncoastal areas, such as inland parks and nature reserves, have 
provoked from property owners responses that are analogous to 
those likely to result from government efforts to enable coastal 
wetlands migration. 
This Article analyzes the adaptability of these existing public and 
private land use mechanisms to the problems of sea level rise and 
coastal wetlands migration. It focuses particular attention on those 
mechanisms that embody the concept of presumed mobility. Section 
II illustrates the opportunities and limitations that accompany 
coastal zone planning through the experience of the states of Maine, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina, and the town of Chatham, 
Massachusetts. The coastal planning regimes that these entities en-
11 [d. at 44-45. 
12 A "bulkhead" is a "retaining wall along a waterfront." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (1973). 
13 Titus, supra note 3, at 45. 
14 [d. 
16 [d. at 44-45. 
16 See id. at 49. 
17 For example, the Nature Conservancy, a membership organization committed to pre-
serving biodiversity through ecosystem protection and management, has purchased and main-
tains tens of thousands of acres of threatened wetlands. See John Madson, Wetlands, NATURE 
CONSERVANCY NEWS, Dec.-Jan. 1987, at 3. 
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acted all contain prohibitions on rebuilding within specified "setback" 
zones following storm damage. 18 They thus institutionalize the pre-
sumption that humanly constructed structures can be mobile. 
Section III of this Article proposes to adapt particular land use 
tools to the problem of wetlands migration. For example, when the 
National Park Service creates national parks, it occasionally grants 
original property owners reservations of use and occupancy, gener-
ally of lifetime duration, in order to ease the transition from private 
to public ownership. Very similar to a traditional lease, the reser-
vation effectively transforms the property owner into a long-term 
tenant. In addition, the reservation reduces the government's pur-
chase price for the property by the value accorded the reservation, 
while it curtails the original owner's rights in the property. 
Government-subsidized flood insurance programs and private land 
trusts are additional land use mechanisms that are potentially ap-
plicable to the issue of coastal wetlands migration. While the N a-
tional Flood Insurance Program19 acts to compensate owners of 
coastal structures for water damage, it could be adapted to discour-
age upland development. Land trusts could involve the private sec-
tor in acquiring sensitive upland areas. 
Section IV examines, through the experiences of Utah and Mich-
igan, what a government can, as well as what it cannot, accomplish 
ifit delays action until a rise in water level reaches crisis proportions. 
During the 1980s, both states experienced drastic rises in lake levels, 
resulting in property damage and abandonment. After a period of 
indecision, Utah chose to pump water into the desert, where the 
water evaporated.20 Michigan, on the other hand, chose to subsidize 
an orderly retreat from the shoreline.21 Finally, Section V draws 
conclusions about the advantages of both planning for an orderly 
retreat from the coastline and institutionalizing the concept of pre-
sumed mobility. 
II. COASTAL ZONE PLANNING: EXISTING SCHEMES AS POTENTIAL 
MODELS 
There are many uncertainties associated with coastal wetlands 
migration, including the extent of sea level rise, the impact of global 
18 A "setback zone," as used in this Article, refers to "a distance from the shoreline within 
which building is prohibited or restricted." TINER, supra note 4, at 2. 
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988). 
20 See infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text. 
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warming on weather patterns, and the ability of wetlands vegetation 
to relocate successfully in a relatively short time period. 22 Through 
careful planning, however, state and local governments can institute 
policies that allow them to respond with solutions that are adaptable 
to a range of contingencies. The following four case studies illustrate 
the advantages of coastal zone planning and the need for careful and 
consistent implementation of planning mechanisms. They also dem-
onstrate the resistance to land use restrictions that some coastal 
property owners inevitably manifest. 
A. Maine's Coastal Sand Dunes Rules 
Faced with a sea level rise of close to an inch per decade,23 Maine 
has implemented coastal management policies that demonstrate the 
state's concern over the threat the rising sea poses to the preser-
vation of its coastal resources. Adopted in 1985, these policies include 
a legislative directive to discourage development in coastal areas 
where storms, flooding, landslides, and sea level rise may pose haz-
ard to human health and safety.24 Maine's efforts to protect its sandy 
beaches exemplify the practical application of this policy, providing 
insight into a framework of setback mechanisms that may be appro-
priate for enabling coastal wetlands migration. 
In Maine, only thirty-six miles of the state's 3,500 miles of coastline 
are sandy beaches, and fourteen of these miles are already seawalls. 25 
When severe storms in 1978 caused $47 million in damage to beach-
front property,26 the state was spurred into addressing the issue of 
regulating beachfront development. The legislature amended the 
existing statute regulating the alteration of coastal wetlands through 
its passage of the Coastal Sand Dunes Law in 1979.27 
N ow incorporated into the Natural Resources Protection Act ,28 
the Coastal Sand Dunes Law extends to coastal sand dune systems 
the construction permitting requirements that were already appli-
cable to coastal wetlands. The statute defines "sand dune systems" 
as sand deposits that exist within a marine beach system, and that 
22 See Houghton, supra note 1, at 39--43. 
23 Karen A. Massey, Protecting Sand Dunes: The Maine Experience in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COASTAL SOCIETY 9, 11 (1984). 
24 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1801(4) (West 1989). 
25 Massey, supra note 23. A "seawall" is "a wall or embankment to protect the shore from 
erosion or to act as a breakwater." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973). 
26 Massey, supra note 23, at 9. 
27 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 471-478 (West 1989) (repealed 1987). 
28 [d. at § 480-A-S. 
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"may extend into the coastal wetlands."29 Under the statute, the 
state Board of Environmental Protection (BEP) may issue a permit 
for construction only if an applicant can show that its proposed 
development will not have any of the following deleterious effects: 
causing unreasonable erosion or inhibiting the natural transfer of 
soil from the terrestrial environment to the marine environment; 
unreasonably harming any significant wildlife habitat, aquatic habi-
tat, travel corridor, estuarine or marine fishery, or other aquatic life; 
unreasonably interfering with the natural flow of water; unreason-
ably interfering with the natural supply or movement of sand within 
or to the sand dune system; or unreasonably increasing the erosion 
hazard. 30 
The regulations that followed from the Coastal Sand Dunes Law 
directly address sea level rise. The preamble to the Coastal Sand 
Dunes Rules requires that the BEP consider future sea level rise in 
determining size, density, and location restrictions for proposed de-
velopments.31 For example, any applicant for a sand dunes permit 
for a building larger than 2,500 square feet must demonstrate to the 
BEP that the site will remain stable after allowing for a three-foot 
sea level rise over 100 years.32 In addition, the regulations prohibit 
the construction of seawalls on any sand dune system and create a 
"no-build area," called the "V-zone," that encompasses the frontal 
dune in each system. 33 Less drastic restrictions upon construction 
apply within so-called "A-zones" and "B-zones," which are at less 
risk of erosion and flooding.34 The regulations also bar development 
if, within 100 years, structures "may reasonably be expected to be 
damaged as a result of changes in the shoreline."35 If storm damage 
29 Id. § 480-B(1). 
30 Id. § 480-D. 
31 "[T]he Board will evaluate proposed developments with consideration given to future sea 
level rise and will impose restrictions on the density and location of development, and on the 
size of development." Code Me. R. ch. 355, § 3 (1988). 
32 No construction is permitted for any building "greater than 2500 square feet . . . unless 
the applicant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the site will remain stable 
after allowing for a three-foot rise in sea level over 100 years." Id. at § 3(B)(2)(c). 
33 Id. at § 3(B)(1)-(2), (F). The "frontal dune" is "the area consisting of the most seaward 
ridge of sand and includes former frontal dune areas modified by development. Where the 
dune has been altered from a natural condition, the dune positions may be inferred from the 
present beach profile, dune positions along the shore, and regional trends in dune width." I d. 
at § 1(0). The V-zone is "[t]hat land area of special flood hazard subject to a one percent or 
greater chance of flooding in any given year, and subject to additional hazard from high 
velocity water due to wave action." Id. at § l(BB). 
34 Id. at § 3(B). The A-zone encompasses the one-hundred year flood area, while the B-
zone is the five-hundred year flood area. Id. at § l(A)-(B). 
36 Id. at § 3(A)(2). 
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to a structure exceeds fifty percent of its appraised value, the struc-
ture's owner must obtain a sand dunes permit prior to rebuilding. 36 
Maine's Coastal Sand Dune Rules anticipate wetlands migration. 
If shoreline conditions change so that coastal wetlands extend to any 
part of a structure, even to its support posts, for a period of at least 
six months, the structure must be relocated.37 This provision for 
wetlands protection embodies the concept of presumed mobility by 
shifting the disadvantages of sea level rise from the wetland to the 
property owner. Coastal residents are on notice that wetlands mi-
gration may require the relocation of their shorefront structures, 
because the regulations institutionalize the idea that wetlands pre-
servation takes precedence over protection of property values. 
Since their promulgation, the coastal sand dune regulations have 
survived legal challenge. The most notable challenge occurred in the 
case of Hall v. Board of Environmental Protection,38 which involved 
a family that attempted to rebuild a structure lost to erosion. The 
Halls' cottage was almost complete when they learned that, under 
the regulations, they needed to apply to the Board of Environmental 
Protection (BEP) for a permit.39 The BEP subsequently denied their 
application on the basis that the structure would interfere with the 
natural supply and movement of sand, present an erosion hazard, 
and likely be in a V -zone within twenty-five years. 40 The case twisted 
back and forth through the state's courts and reached the Maine 
Supreme Court twice on appeal. 41 In 1987, the court applied tradi-
tional takings doctrine to the case and held that the Halls did not 
meet their burden of showing that the permit denial had rendered 
their property substantially useless, particularly because the family 
had been occupying a motor home on the lot during the summer. 42 
The Coastal Sand Dunes Rules have been successful in controlling 
coastline development in order to protect coastal wetlands. For ex-
ample, in 1987, the BEP denied the application of the Atlantic Con-
dominium Development Corporation (ACDC) for a permit to con-
struct a ninety-six-unit condominium in Old Orchard Beach.43 Upon 
36 [d. at § 2(c) note. 
37 [d. at § 3(B)(I)(b). 
38 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987). 
89 [d. at 454-ii5. 
40 Brief for Intervenor Maine Audubon Society at 8, Hall v. Board oj Envtl. Protection, 
528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987). 
41 Hall, 528 A.2d at 455. 
42 [d. at 455-56. 
43 A. David Rapaport, Alteration of Coastal Wetlands Act: Sand Dunes, 1 (Me. Dep't of 
Envtl. Protection 1987) (order). 
8 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:1 
review of a subsequently amended application, the BEP issued a 
draft order stating that ACnC had not shown clearly that the project 
would not be located in a coastal wetland or intertidal area within 
100 years as a result of shoreline retreat, sea level rise, and the 
absence of seawalls. 44 ACnC withdrew its application in April 1988. 
While Maine's Coastal Sand Dunes Rules have yet to face signifi-
cant public pressure in favor of rebuilding after major storm damage, 
they generally have been accepted by property owners. The Rules 
have not stopped coastal development, but have directed the location 
and type of development. State officials credit a strong effort at 
public education for their success in convincing coastal residents of 
the certainty of sea level rise and continued beach erosion. 45 During 
public hearings over the latest revisions to the Rules in 1988, debate 
centered not on the question of whether sea level rise would occur, 
but rather on the issue of which estimate regarding the rate of sea 
level rise to follow-the National Academy of Sciences' or the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency's.46 The public recognition 
in Maine of the concept of sea level rise and the presumption of 
mobility built into the Coastal Sand Dunes Rules combine to make 
Maine perhaps the premier testing ground for the ability of coastal 
wetlands to migrate over previously developed land. 
B. North Carolina's Coastal Area Management Act 
The coastal area of North Carolina is primarily rural, composed 
of extensive wetlands, forests, farmlands, and sandy barrier is-
lands. 47 This rich resource is fragile, however, and is subject to 
rapidly increasing pressure for recreational development, particu-
larly on the barrier islands. 48 The rate of coastal erosion is great-
eighteen percent of the shoreline has an annual erosion rate of six 
feet. 49 
In response to these threats to its coast, the state of North Car-
olina has crafted a strong set of beachfront development restrictions 
that include comprehensive local planning. These restrictions, au-
44 Atlantic Condominium Dev. Corp., Alteration of Coastal Wetlands Act: Sand Dunes, 1 
(Me. Dep't of Envtl. Protection 1988) (order). 
45 Telephone Interview with Stephen Dickson, Marine Geologist, Me. Dep't of Conservation 
(Jan. 22, 1990). 
45 [d. 
47 David W. Owens, Coastal Management in North Carolina, APA JOURNAL 322, 322 
(1985). 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 325. 
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thorized in the 1974 Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA),50 have 
succeeded despite both local antipathy to state government interfer-
ence and significant challenges by development interests. 
Before the enactment of CAMA in 1974, comprehensive land use 
planning was almost nonexistent in coastal North Carolina. Most 
rural counties and towns did not have land use plans or even zoning 
ordinances, and there was opposition to the mere idea of coastal 
resource management. 51 The idea of a state coastal management 
program, first discussed in the late 1960s, was met with skepticism 
from municipalities that felt such a scheme unfairly would compel 
them to enforce unpopular rules. 52 Despite this climate of unfavor-
able local opinion, state planners decided that the potential power 
of local regulations was vital to the success of a coastal management 
plan. 53 
To overcome the resistance that arose against CAMA upon its 
proposal in the state's General Assembly, the North Carolina De-
partment of Natural Resources and Community Development em-
barked on an extensive effort to educate local planners about the 
importance of resource management. 54 State personnel presented 
the idea of local planning to the citizens of each region in a manner 
fitting the character of the region, using low-key meetings and non-
technical language. 55 This approach, over time, allowed the state to 
gain widespread popular support for the CAMA bill and adapt its 
provisions to the needs of individual localities. 56 A primary lesson 
that one may draw from this case study is that a sensitivity to local 
concerns and a willingness to invest in the labor-intensive process 
of educating the public can be vital to the success of long-term 
natural resource management. 
Under CAMA, local officials are responsible for enforcement, in-
cluding the issuance of permits for smaller structures. 57 CAMA man-
dates the development of comprehensive local land use plans, each 
including a survey of resources, policy discussion, and the subdivi-
sion of the locality by "permissible use."58 In return, the state grants 
50 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-lOO to -113A-129 (1989). 
51 Owens, supra note 47, at 322-24. 
52 Id. 
63 Id. at 324. 
MId. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 324-25. 
57 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-119 (1989). 
58 Id. at § 113A-ll0. 
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subsidies for beach renourishment and provides technical assistance 
and a staff liaison to each locality. 59 Every permit application re-
quires an on-site inspection and consultation, which cuts down on 
misunderstandings and controversies. 60 Currently, all twenty coastal 
counties, as well as seventy-five municipalities, have land use plans 
under CAMA, and these plans are updated every five years. 61 
Pursuant to CAMA, the General Assembly created the Coastal 
Resources Commission (CRC) in 1974 to develop specific guidelines 
for municipal implementation of the Act.62 In these guidelines, the 
CRC designated four categories of "areas of environmental concern": 
the estuarine system, the "ocean hazard" system, public water sup-
plies, and natural and cultural resource areas. 63 The CRC's State 
Guidelines for Areas of Environmental Concern provide local gov-
ernments with a blueprint for the treatment of these areas in land 
use plans by' establishing uniform "policies, criteria, standards, 
methods and processes."64 The guidelines for the ocean hazard sys-
tem constitute a coastal planning mechanism that may enable wet-
lands migration. 
Under the guidelines, development in the ocean hazard system 
must be landward of the "erosion setback line," which is measured 
from the first line of stable vegetation and equals thirty times the 
long-term annual erosion rate. 65 The guidelines specify a minimum 
distance of sixty feet between the proposed structure and the erosion 
setback line.66 Setbacks of no less than 120 feet are required for 
larger, multi-family structures.67 The guidelines also contain specific 
69 [d. at § 113A-107. 
60 Telephone interview with Rich Shaw, Coastal Program Analyst, Bureau of Technical 
Assistance, Div. of Coastal Management, N.C. Dep't of Natural Resources (Feb. 6, 1990). 
61 [d. 
62 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107 (1989). 
63 The estuarine system includes "estuarine waters, coastal wetlands, public trust areas, 
and estuarine shorelines." N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0201 (Dec. 1989). 
The ocean hazard system includes "beaches, frontal dunes, inlet lands, and other areas in 
which geologic, vegetative and soil conditions indicate a substantial possibility of excessive 
erosion or flood damage." [d. at r. 7H.0301. 
Public water supplies include "valuable small surface water supply watersheds and public 
water supply well fields." [d. at r. 7H.0401. 
Natural and cultural resource areas contain "environmental, natural or cultural resources 
of more than local significance in which uncontrolled or incompatible development could result 
in major or irr~versible damage to natural systems or cultural resources, scientific, educa-
tional, or associative values, or aesthetic qualities." [d. at r. 7H.0501. 
64 [d. at r. 7H.OlOl. 
66 [d. at r. 7H.0306. 
66 [d. 
67 [d. 
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use standards that prohibit erosion control structures such as bulk-
heads, seawalls, revetments, jetties, groins, and breakwaters. 68 
Each applicant for a development permit in an ocean hazard area 
must provide a written acknowledgment that it is aware of both the 
risks associated with development in the area and the area's unsuit-
ability for permanent structures. 69 
The CRC first elicited public comment on its setback rule in 1978. 
While there was little opposition during these public hearings, the 
Council was confronted in 1980, one year after the rule was adopted, 
by angry property owners and other real estate interests who real-
ized that enforcement of the rule rendered many substandard coastal 
lots undevelopable. 70 After an intense public outcry, the CRC agreed 
to reexamine its position. It eventually adopted two changes: an 
exemption for low-intensity uses such as camping; and a grandfather 
clause for lots that were subdivided before the year 1979.71 Although 
these changes still left about 500 lots undevelopable, the controversy 
subsided, and the setback rule remained in place. 72 
Three years later, the CRC decided that, because relocation was 
not a viable economic option for large structures, the setbacks re-
quired for them should be increased. After ten months of public 
hearings, it doubled the minimum erosion rate setback for structures 
of over four dwelling units or 5000 square feet. This change produced 
a second outcry, most notably from Dare County, a major tourist 
destination, which withdrew from administering the local permit 
program. 73 When faced with a strong stand by the CRC and a 
promised loss of state subsidies, however, Dare County relented and 
rejoined the program. 74 
CAMA has survived seventeen years of controversy and currently 
enjoys widespread support. As the statute has gotten older, it has 
become more accepted and less open to criticism.75 Among the rea-
68 [d. at r. 7H.0308. A "revetment" is "a facing (as of stone or concrete) to sustain an 
embankment"; "jetty" is "a structure extended into a sea, lake, or river to influence the 
current or tide or to protect a harbor"; "groin" is "a rigid structure built out from a shore to 
protect the shore from erosion, to trap sand, or to direct a current for scouring a channel"; 
and a "breakwater" is "an offshore structure (as a wall) used to protect a harbor or beach 
from the force of waves." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973). 
69 N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0306 (Dec. 1989). 
70 Owens, supra note 47, at 326. 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 [d.; Shaw, supra note 60. 
74 Shaw, supra note 60. 
75 [d. 
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sons that CAMA has not faced organized opposition may be the fact 
that the tourist industry in North Carolina is relatively undevel-
oped. 76 Another key to the statute's success may be that its regu-
latory scheme stresses protecting property and life, rather than 
preserving the beach or the environment. 77 Property owners thus 
perceive that CAMA directly serves their interests. The view that 
the public is only concerned with protecting life and property, how-
ever, ignores the fact that a beach devoid of erosion control devices 
has great recreational and aesthetic appeal. In the case of coastal 
wetlands migration, educating the public to the value of wetlands 
ecosystems is a key to obtaining the necessary support for any 
setback restrictions. 
C. South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act 
South Carolina's attempt to restrict development on its beaches 
by enacting the 1988 Beachfront Management Act (BMA)78 has faced 
stiff opposition from the state's booming tourism industry. This con-
flict reached a critical point in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, 
which in September 1988 damaged or destroyed thousands of coastal 
properties. 79 In June 1990, the state legislature amended BMA, 
weakening some of its coastal protection measures while strength-
ening others.80 Moreover, BMA's validity has been at issue in the 
courts since before Hurricane Hugo. 81 The outcome of these chal-
lenges may determine the state's ability to control coastal growth. 
All in all, South Carolina's experience illustrates the resistance that 
government entities may confront in their attempts to restrict prop-
erty rights in upland areas adjacent to coastal wetlands. 
In 1986, the South Carolina Coastal Council, a state agency, set 
up a Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management to make 
recommendations regarding how to address the continuing erosion 
of the state's shoreline.82 In 1988, the Committee sent the results of 
its work, including a statement recognizing the role that sea level 
rise will play in shoreline erosion, to the state legislature in the form 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-270 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). 
79 Bill McAllister, A Hurricane's Fury Fast Forgotten, WASH. POST, April 9, 1990, at AI. 
80 See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text. 
81 Id. 
82 Erick B. Ficken, Prefatory Letter to REPORT OF SOUTH CAROLINA BLUE RIBBON 
COMMITTEE ON BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT (1987). 
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of the BMA bill. During the public debate on the bill, environmental 
lobbyists clashed with representatives of coastal property owners 
and lending institutions over the determination of setback lines and 
the ability to rebuild after a storm. Banks were particularly adamant 
in opposing the bill, because they believed that the mortgages they 
held would be jeopardized. 83 
The state legislature enacted BMA in 1988, putting into place some 
of the strongest restrictions on coastal development in the nation. 
For example, the Act barred both new construction and the replace-
ment of destroyed buildings in an "erosion control zone"-commonly 
referred to as the "dead zone"-extending twenty feet back from 
the "primary," or frontal, dune. 84 BMA also restricted development 
in a "setback zone" behind the dead zone. 85 Lastly, the Act prohibited 
rebuilding seawalls that were more than fifty-percent damaged, and 
mandated that property owners replace all seawalls with approved 
erosion control devices within thirty years of the passage of the 
law. 86 
The "post-Hugo" 1990 amendments to BMA eliminated the dead 
zone, are more lenient in their restrictions on reconstructing seawalls 
and no longer require replacement of existing seawalls with ap-
proved erosion control devices.87 The new law, however, does pro-
hibit the construction of new erosion control devices, including new 
seawalls, seaward of the "baseline," which is the crest of the primary 
dune. 88 The amendments also retain the setback zone, which must 
extend landward of the primary dune for a distance of forty times 
the average annual erosion rate, or a minimum of twenty feet.89 The 
state must revise the setback line at least every ten years.90 Within 
the setback zone, the reconstruction of buildings destroyed beyond 
repair by natural causes is allowed, but replacement structures can 
be no farther seaward than the originals. 91 In addition, a recon-
structed building must be rebuilt as far landward as possible and 
cannot be larger than the original building. 92 
83 Telephone Interview with Nancy Tecklinburg, Attorney, South Carolina Coastal Council 
(April 16, 1990). 
84 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-290(B)(8), 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). 
85 [d. at §§ 48-39-290, 48-39-300. 
86 [d. at § 48-39-290(C). 
87 [d. at § 48-39-290(B). 
88 [d. 
89 [d. at § 48-39-280(B). 
90 [d. at § 48-39-280(C). 
91 [d. at § 48-39-290(B)(I). 
92 [d. 
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The 1990 amendments bar any reconstruction seaward of the pri-
mary dune, although they also provide a procedure by which a 
property owner may obtain a variance from this prohibition. 93 This 
"special permit" provision gives the Council the power to permit 
construction or reconstruction seaward of the baseline with the un-
derstanding that the Council also has the power to order the struc-
ture's removal if erosion causes it to become located on an "active 
beach."94 An active beach is the area seaward of the "escarpment," 
or the first line of stable natural vegetation. 95 
The original BMA had required local governments to formulate 
their own beachfront management plans by July 11, 1990, and to 
implement the plans within one year from that date. 96 The 1990 
BMA amendments retained these planning requirements, but gave 
local governments another year to prepare the plans. 97 The goal of 
the planning requirement is to allow municipalities to adapt the 
statute to their own circumstances and thereby make it stronger and 
more effective. 98 For its part, the state offers assistance in base 
mapping, photography, and preparation of beach profiles and pub-
lishes a planning guidebook. 99 In addition, a staff member from the 
Coastal Council is assigned to each municipality as a liaison.1°O This 
attempt at involving local governments seems promising, particu-
larly because the state is taking an active role in educating and 
advising local officials. There are some less-developed coastal towns 
in South Carolina that have no existing land use planning or zoning 
scheme,101 however, and the Coastal Council has recognized that it 
will encounter significant difficulties in trying to implement beach-
front management plans in these areas. 
Even before Hurricane Hugo wreaked havoc on South Carolina's 
coastline, owners of property along the coast were challenging BMA 
in lawsuits. In August 1988, a South Carolina Circuit Court ordered 
the Coastal Council to pay the owner of property on a barrier island 
near Charleston $1.2 million in compensation after finding that the 
owner's inability to build anything other than a deck or walkway on 
93 Id. at § 48-39-290(D). 
94 Id. 
95 I d. at § 48-39-270(13). 
96 Id. at § 48-39-350. 
97 See id. at §§ 48-39-260, 48-39-350. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Tecklinburg, supra note 83. 
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his two "dead zone" lots rendered them "valueless" and thus consti-
tuted a taking. 102 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court held 
that the restrictions amounted to a proper exercise of the state's 
police power, that there was no taking, and, accordingly, that the 
state had no obligation to compensate the property owner. 103 
The state has obtained similarly favorable results in federal court. 
In Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council,104 the U.S. District 
Court for the District of South Carolina held that the Council's 
preventing the plaintiff from building a vacation home within twenty 
feet of the coastal baseline constituted a taking and warranted com-
pensation. l05 In Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,106 the 
same court found no evidence that the Council actually had denied 
the plaintiffs permission to build or rebuild in the dead zone.107 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, 
upheld the Coastal Council's application of BMA as to the landowners 
in both of these cases, finding that prevention of shoreline erosion 
was a legitimate state interest, and that there were no takings. 108 
The elimination of the dead zone in the 1990 BMA amendments 
renders the precise issues in these cases moot. The court's accep-
tance of stringent setback restrictions as a rational method of ad-
vancing the state interest in shoreline protection, however, indicates 
that similar provisions aimed at enabling coastal wetlands migration 
through the institutionalization of presumed mobility could survive 
a challenge based on a takings theory. 
Following the damage that Hurricane Hugo caused in September 
1988, BMA regulated the rebuilding of approximately 150 coastal 
properties, allowing most of these structures to be rebuilt, but re-
stricting them to sites further inland on the same lots. 109 The Coastal 
Council came under heavy criticism for being too lenient in deter-
mining whether a building was so damaged that it could not be 
rebuilt. 110 Although the Council vigorously defended its implemen-
102 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, CIA No. 88-CP-I0-66, slip op. (C.P. Charleston 
County, Aug. 10, 1989). See generally, Harold N. Skelton, Houses on the Sand: Takings 
Issues Surrounding Statutory Restrictions on the Use o/Oceanfront Property, 18 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L.REV. 125 (1990) for a discussion of takings law as applicable in coastal zone situations, 
particularly South Carolina and Chatham, Massachusetts. 
loa Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). 
104 No. D:89-0216-1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17228 (D. S.C. Oct. 13, 1989). 
105 Id. at * 6-* 7. 
106 No. D:88-2055-1, slip op. (D. S.C. Oct. 13, 1989). 
107 Id. at 6. 
108 Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991). 
109 Tecklinburg, supra note 83. 
110 McAllister, supra note 79, at A8. 
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tation of BMA in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo,111 there were 
approximately fifty lawsuits filed over its decisions not to permit 
rebuilding after the hurricane. 112 This litigation, however, has in-
volved structures other than actual houses, such as swimming pools 
and seawalls. 113 
While the case study of South Carolina may seem discouraging in 
light of the success that development interests have had in loosening 
BMA's original restrictions, there are reasons for optimism. First, 
inland South Carolina residents remain solidly in favor of restrictions 
on beachfront construction. Hugo has made them realize the tre-
mendous costs that the entire state must bear in allowing unwise 
shorefront development. 114 Second, the recent BMA amendments 
retain the setback zone requirement and the restrictions on rebuild-
ing within that zone-restrictions that embody the concept of pre-
sumed mobility. 
D. Chatham, Massachusetts: The Breach at North Beach 
The town of Chatham, located on Massachusetts's Cape Cod, pro-
vides an example of the confusion that can ensue, despite seemingly 
adequate coastal planning mechanisms, when a vague and distant 
threat suddenly becomes an immediate and urgent hazard. Chatham 
sits on Pleasant Bay, which is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by 
a barrier island known as North Beach. Historically, the ocean has 
breached North Beach at intervals of roughly 100 to 150 years, after 
which the beach gradually reforms. 115 A 1978 study predicted that a 
breach in North Beach would occur sometime during the 1980s. 116 
On January 2, 1987, as foreseen, a severe winter storm coupled with 
extremely high tides effected a breach in North Beach and exposed 
Pleasant Bay and Chatham to the force of ocean waves.117 As the 
breach widened, it quickly became obvious that the beach erosion 
resulting from the increased wave action would threaten up to 
twenty shoreline residences. 118 
III [d. 
112 Tecklinburg, supra note 83. 
113 [d. Many ofthese cases will be resolved in favor of the property owners if it is determined 
that the 1990 amendments are to be applied retroactively. 
114 [d. 
115 Timothy J. Wood, BREAKTHROUGH: THE STORY OF CHATHAM'S NORTH BEACH 9 (1989). 
116 [d. at 13. 
117 [d. at 33. 
liB [d. at 36. Coastal erosion specialists predict that sea level rise will increase dramatically 
the effects of large storms on the Massachusetts coastline. The south shore of Martha's 
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Massachusetts's Wetlands Protection Regulations prohibit any 
new construction of engineered structures-bulkheads, seawalls, 
revetments, and the like-on sand dunes. 119 The implementation of 
these rules in Chatham following the January 1987 breach of North 
Beach led to confusion, contradictory rulings, and, ultimately, bit-
terness. 120 In March 1987, state officials, following the regulations 
as promUlgated under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, 121 
advised the Chatham Conservation Commission to approve only 
"soft" erosion control measures, such as beach nourishment, dune 
grass planting, and sandbag placement. 122 In November of that year, 
the Commission granted an emergency work permit for the construc-
tion of a temporary soft structure, but local homeowners, who had 
organized into a group that went by the acronym BREACH, failed 
to agree on an engineering method; as a result, the soft structure 
was never built. 123 
In December 1987, the state Department of Environmental Qual-
ity Engineering's (DEQE's) Coastal Zone Management office refused 
to permit the construction of a rock revetment on the Chatham 
beach. l24 The affected property owners obtained a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting federal, state, and local governments 
from interfering with the building of a temporary rock revetment. 125 
The property owners had rocks placed haphazardly along the beach 
in front of their threatened homes, causing a worsening of the ero-
sion. 126 Although subsequent court orders in January 1988 required 
the removal of some of the rocks and prohibited the placement of 
more,127 further truckloads of rocks were dumped illegally along the 
beach. 128 This stop-gap measure was insufficient to stop the destruc-
tion of six of the beachfront homes due to erosion,l29 and two of the 
Vineyard, for example, may retreat 1000 feet over the next century, with storms like August 
1991's HUITicane Bob causing the most damage. Some Vineyard dunes lost 20 to 25 feet during 
HUITicane Bob. Dianne Dumanoski, Latest Assault Took Bites Out of Islands' Beaches, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1991, at A24. 
119 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 10.28 (1988). 
120 See Wood, supra note 115, at 43-66. 
121 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1990). 
122 Wood, supra note 115, at 37. 
123 Id. at 50-52. 
124 Id. at 51. 
125 Id. at 54. 
126 Id. 
127 I d. at 55. 
128 Id. at 55-57. 
129 Id. at 43, 69. 
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homeowners now have suits pending against the state. 130 Eventually, 
DEQE and local officials permitted rock structures on the coastal 
bank areas. 131 To date, twenty-eight Chatham property owners af-
fected by the breach have built revetments. 132 
The underlying problem with the enforcement of the Massachu-
setts beach protection regulations was that the state, the officials of 
the town of Chatham, and the public had not adequately confronted 
the probability that such enforcement would lead to the destruction 
of private residences. l33 The legal and political issues presented by 
a regulatory scheme that institutionalizes the concept of presumed 
mobility therefore were unresolved when houses began falling into 
the sea. In developing any plan to allow for coastal wetlands migra-
tion, the sometimes painful process of public discussion must be 
complete before sea level rise threatens private property. 
As the four preceding examples of coastal zone planning indicate, 
public understanding and acceptance is vital to the success of any 
program that aims to have property owners abandon their shoreline 
residences as the sea encroaches. The institutionalization of the con-
cept of presumed mobility involves more than the passage of legis-
lation and a commitment on the part of regulatory agencies, although 
these are essential elements. It also requires a broad-based willing-
ness to give precedence to natural coastal processes over traditional 
property rights. 
As the next section of this Article demonstrates, mechanisms 
other than coastal setback restrictions may be useful in enabling 
wetlands migration. Reservations of use and occupancy, flood insur-
ance provisions, and land trusts all can incorporate the concept of 
presumed mobility, providing a means for facilitating wetlands mi-
gration in the future at a relatively low cost today. 
III. LAND USE MECHANISMS ADAPTABLE TO THE PROMOTION OF 
WETLANDS MIGRATION 
A. Reservations of Use and Occupancy 
In creating national parks, Congress occasionally gives the N a-
tional Park Service the authority to grant "reservations of use and 
130 Plaintiffs seek damages in amount of $1.5 million. See id. at 69; Telephone interview 
with Nicholas Soutter, attorney for plaintiffs Wilson and Rolfe, Feb. 21, 1990. 
131 Wood, supra note 115, at 69. 
132 Telephone Interview with Timothy J. Wood, Cape Cod Chronicle (Sept. 13, 1991). 
133 See Wood, supra note 115, at 64. 
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occupancy" to landowners who otherwise would be displaced because 
their property falls within the boundaries of the new park. 134 The 
Park Service acquires the property through donation, purchase, or 
condemnation, but allows the previous owner to retain use of the 
property for either a term of years or for life. l35 The reservation is 
an interest in real property and is transferable. There are currently 
about 1600 such reservations on Park Service lands. 136 
Reservations of use and occupancy provide two distinct advan-
tages to outright government purchase of land. First, holders of 
these reservations may stay on "their" land, although they often are 
prohibited from making improvements to the property without Park 
Service permission, in order to prevent further development. 137 The 
Park Service has encountered few problems in enforcing the terms 
of its reservations of use and occupancy, 138 perhaps because the areas 
affected are relatively small and easily monitored. Second, reser-
vations of use and occupancy not only ease the transition from pri-
vate to public ownership, but also reduce the government's cost in 
acquiring property. Purchase price is calculated as the current value 
of the property less one percent for each year of the term of the 
reservation (or of the life expectancy of the reserver for a lifetime 
reservation). 139 
A mechanism like a reservation of use and occupancy, which most 
closely resembles a long-term lease, could be useful in protecting 
upland areas adjacent to existing coastal wetlands, whether or not 
the areas have been developed. Preserving these areas will provide 
locations into which coastal wetlands can move naturally as the sea 
level rises. The reservation mechanism would serve to institution-
alize the concept of presumed mobility by giving reservation holders 
a relatively set time frame for their occupancy. Moreover, because 
current predictions hold that the sea will rise gradually over the 
next century, the term of a reservation for use and occupancy of 
coastal areas could be measured in decades, enabling the government 
to take advantage of a substantial discount rate. The use of reser-
134 Telephone Interview with Will Kriz, Land Acquisitions, National Park Service (June 
27,1990). 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 See, e.g., Offer to Sell Real Property, Contract No. CX408740065, U.S. Dep't of the 
Interior, (1973) (on file with author). 
138 Kriz, supra note 134. 
139 [d. 
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vations to enable wetlands migration therefore could be a cost-effec-
tive means of acquiring ecologically sensitive private property. 
B. Federal Flood Insurance 
In 1968, following several disastrous floods around the United 
States earlier in the decade,140 Congress enacted the National Flood 
Insurance Act (NFIA).141 The statute directed the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA), under the National Flood In-
surance Program (NFIP), to identify and map flood-prone areas, 
make flood insurance available to property owners, and promote 
state and local land use controls that would guide development away 
from flood hazard zones. 142 The NFIP has great potential to direct 
development away from areas threatened by sea level rise and en-
croaching wetlands. This potential, however, is far from being re-
alized. 
While, under the NFIP, FEMA has succeeded in identifying haz-
ard areas and providing low-cost flood insurance to property owners, 
the agency generally has not required state and local governments 
participating in the program to restrain development in flood-prone 
areas. Instead, FEMA requires participating communities to adopt 
and enforce minimum floodplain construction standards. 143 These in-
clude requirements to locate all new structures landward of mean 
high tide; elevate structures above the base flood level; anchor struc-
tures against a 100-year flood; and prohibit alterations of sand dunes 
and mangrove stands when those alterations will increase potential 
flood damage. 144 These requirements clearly do not guide develop-
ment away from flood-prone areas, but rather seek to reduce dam-
ages to humanly constructed structures in the event of a major flood. 
The adoption of stricter building standards may have boosted 
confidence in the ability of structures to withstand flooding. In ad-
dition, flood insurance, which previously was not available to many 
homeowners in coastal areas, now provides new security to lenders 
as well as individuals desiring to build along the coast. 145 Flood 
insurance policies issued under the NFIP may have limitless repeat 
140 Beth Millemann, Time, Tide and Federal Insurers, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1991, at C3. 
141 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988). 
142 Id. 
143 44 C.F.R. § 59.22 (1990). 
144 Id. 
145 U.S. General Accounting Office, National Flood Insurance: Marginal Impacts on Flood 
Plain Development-Administrative Improvements Needed, 7 (GAO/CED-82-105, Aug. 16, 
1982). 
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claims made against them without any increase in the premiums. 146 
The combination of these factors, rather than directing development 
away from coastal lands, actually may encourage building on sensi-
tive lands. 
Amendments to NFIA in 1988 addressed some of the shortcomings 
of the program and provided it with the flexibility to adapt to the 
specific problems associated with sea level rise and wetlands migra-
tion. Fostering the idea of presumed mobility, the amendments en-
courage homeowners to demolish or relocate their houses when ero-
sion subjects the houses to imminent collapse. For example, a 
homeowner may receive 100% of the cash value of the house plus up 
to ten percent of that figure to cover demolition costS. 147 Home-
owners opting for relocation are eligible for relocation costs of up to 
forty-percent of the cash value of the house. 148 Since 1988, only 360 
claims for demolition or relocation have been filed. 149 Of these, 160 
have been approved, 130 for demolition. 150 The greatest barrier to 
eligibility for demolition or relocation funds has been a requirement 
that the local government condemn the structure. 151 
Legislation introduced in Congress in the 1991 session would ad-
dress some of the NFIP's shortcomings. 152 The bill would require 
FEMA to establish erosion setbacks for all structures. 153 It also 
would mandate that the agency take the risk of sea level rise into 
account in establishing flood insurance premiums; use ten percent of 
premiums collected to increase funding for its purchases of extremely 
flood-prone properties; and set aside five percent of premiums col-
lected for the mitigation, through relocation and removal, of repet-
itive losses. 154 
c. Land Trusts 
Recognizing that government efforts at conservation often come 
too little and too late, private groups are becoming increasingly 
146 Millemann, supra note 140. 
147 42 U.S.C. § 4013. 
146 Id. 
149 Telephone Interview with Mike Buckley, Federal Emergency Management Agency (July 
2, 1990). 
150 Id. 
151 I d. Perhaps local governments fear both the bad press involved in condemning shorefront 
property and the loss of taxable property. 
152 H.R. 1236, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
22 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:1 
active in the acquisition of property rights for conservation purposes. 
Land trusts are private, nonprofit corporations that use a variety of 
techniques either to acquire property outright or to negotiate con-
servation easements. 155 For example, the Nature Conservancy, the 
nation's largest land trust organization, has an active program for 
acquiring wetlands threatened with development.156 The Conser-
vancy raises money from corporations, foundations, private individ-
uals, and governments. 157 The methods it employs to protect vul-
nerable lands include purchasing property, soliciting land donations 
and bequests, and arranging land trades. 158 The acquisitions program 
focuses on areas that provide a special habitat for threatened or 
endangered species, or that represent unique biological systems. 159 
The Conservancy's agenda easily could encompass the acquisition of 
undeveloped upland areas that should be preserved in order to en-
able wetlands migration. The organization currently allows for a 
possible sea level rise when developing designs for its preserves. 160 
In addition to the Nature Conservancy, there are two national 
organizations that promote the formation and development of local 
land trusts: the Land Trust Exchange in Alexandria, Virginia, and 
the Trust for Public Land (TPL) in San Francisco, California. Unlike 
the Nature Conservancy, these organizations do not have a specific 
agenda such as the protection of endangered species. Rather, they 
serve as resources for regional land trusts and assist in the struc-
turing of property transfers. 161 Their services would be valuable to 
any local group interested in securing property rights in areas ad-
jacent to coastal wetlands. 
Since 1973, TPL has assisted over 200 local land trusts nation-
wide. 162 TPL also has worked to "pre acquire" land that is for sale, 
with the goal of transferring the title to the government or local 
trustS. 163 The organization often intervenes at the request of state 
governments when the state cannot get involved, either because it 
155 Chris Elfring, Preserving Land through Local Land Trusts, BIOSCIENCE, Feb. 1989, at 
71,71-73. 
156 See Madson, supra note 17, at 3. 
157 See id. 
158 [d. 
159 [d. 
160 Letter from Will Murray, Director, Stewardship Administration, Nature Conservancy 
(Jan. 17, 1990) (on file with author). 
161 Martin J. Rosen, Preface to LAND AND PEOPLE 2 (The Trust for Public Land, Summer 
1989). 
162 TPL and Land Trusts, in LAND AND PEOPLE, supra note 161, at 3. 
163 [d. 
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will encounter anti-government sentiment, or because it does not 
have the resources to take action. 164 
In Washington, for example, wetlands conservation is a primary 
concern of many coastal citizens as the state economy booms and 
development pressures increase. The Northwest Regional Office of 
the TPL works with the state's Department of Ecology (DOE) and 
the Capitol County Land Trust, a local organization, to secure con-
servation easements. One of the Capitol County Land Trust's first 
cases involved Woodland Creek, a salt marsh area near Puget 
Sound. 165 A coalition of environmental groups opposed a local land-
owner who tried to develop his wetland property.166 Working with 
the TPL, the Capital County Land Trust mediated the dispute and 
obtained funding through the DOE to purchase the property for 
future conveyance to the county parks department. 167 
Land trusts could preserve undeveloped uplands adjacent to ex-
isting coastal wetlands. A trust could be created through the outright 
purchase of property, although this method would be expensive. A 
less costly alternative would be for a land trust to negotiate the 
terms for the creation and purchase of a "wetlands migration ease-
ment." This type of easement would prevent a landowner from in-
terfering with the encroachment of water and the subsequent crea-
tion of new wetlands as sea level rises, thus incorporating the 
concept of presumed mobility. The land trust, in turn, would have 
the ability to enforce the terms of the easement. The landowner 
would surrender a property right, but the event triggering compli-
ance with the terms of the easement, a rise in sea level, would occur 
decades in the future. Therefore, the land trust would be able to 
discount the cost of purchasing the easement. 
While reservations of use and occupancy, flood insurance, and land 
trusts all have the potential to assist in enabling coastal wetlands 
migration through the institutionalization of presumed mobility, they 
have not yet been tested. The two case studies in the following 
section show how two states actually responded to water level rise, 
and the relative success of those responses. One state chose a costly 
and temporary engineering solution that bypassed natural processes, 
while the other enacted a program that institutionalized the concept 
of presumed mobility. 
164 Fact Sheet, THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, Nov. 1989 (on file with author). 
165 Jim Scott, Woodland Creek Safe with Land Trust, WASH. COASTAL CURRENTS, May 
1988, at 1, 1. 
166 [d. 
167 [d. 
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IV. RESPONDING TO LAKE LEVEL FLUCTUATION: ENGINEERING 
VERSUS RETREAT 
During the past decade, shoreline residents of both the Great 
Lakes and Utah's Great Salt Lake experienced a situation akin to 
sea level rise. Unusually high water levels in these lakes during the 
mid-1980s provoked a variety of reactions from both citizens and 
government officials, giving some indication of how different inter-
ests may respond to sea level rise in the future. In Utah, a tremen-
dous rise in the Great Salt Lake found lakeshore residents unpre-
pared, and led to the implementation of large-scale, short-term 
engineering projects. 168 Michigan, on the other hand, took the more 
long-term approach of reducing the threat to property by creating 
incentives to retreat from the shoreline. 169 This difference in re-
sponse probably is due in part to the fact that the water level changes 
in Utah were almost completely unexpected, while those in Michigan 
were variations on a known hundred-year cycle. The degree to which 
policymakers can engender a popular understanding that sea level 
may rise will determine how effectively society can respond to the 
challenge of coastal wetlands preservation. 
A. Utah 
In the case of the Great Salt Lake, the twelve-foot rise in water 
level between the years 1982 and 1986 was unprecedented in the 
memory of shoreline residents. 17o Records of the lake's normal 
twenty-foot fluctuation cycle, however, date back to the 1840s171 and 
should have made long-term planning an imperative. 
In 1975, the Utah legislature established the Division of the Great 
Salt Lake and the Great Salt Lake Board within the state's Depart-
ment of Natural Resources.172 It charged these units with the task 
of developing a comprehensive management plan for the lake. 173 
While the resulting plan included statements emphasizing the im-
portance of floodplain and hazard zone delineation,174 it was based 
168 See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text. 
169 See infra notes 180-95 and accompanying text. 
170 See Peter M. Morrisette, The Rising Level of the Great Salt Lake: An Analogue of 
Societal Adjustment to Climate Change, in SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO REGIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: FORECASTING BY ANALOGY, 169, 173 (M.H. Glantz ed., 1988). 
171 [d. at 173, 175. 
172 [d. at 182. 
173 UTAH CODE ANN. § 65-8a (1986). 
174 Morrisette, supra note 170, at 182. 
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on a narrow range of lake-level fluctuations, with the estimated high-
water level set at 4202 feet.175 Unfortunately, in light of subsequent 
events, the state never implemented the comprehensive plan. 176 In 
1979, after three years of both receding waters and rapid shoreline 
development, the legislature mandated that, if necessary in the fu-
ture, the lake level would be manipulated so as to be maintained at 
a level below 4202 feet.177 
From 1982 to 1984, the state government watched passively as 
lake levels rose dramatically, surpassing the 4202-foot mark in 
1983. 178 The lake eventually reached a new historical record-high 
level at 4211.85 feet in 1986.179 Flooding hit the shoreline hard, with 
serious damage to public roads and other infrastructure, mineral 
companies-which lost valuable evaporation ponds and were forced 
to ship salt in by train from San Francisco Bay-railroads, waterfowl 
preserves, and recreation areas. 180 The federal government decided 
that it would not pay for substantial flood mitigation programs in 
Utah, thus leaving the cost of such projects to the state. 181 
State resource management agencies devised plans to either pump 
water away from the lake or divert incoming rivers.182 A group of 
state agencies lobbied hard for the project to pump water into the 
desert, where it would evaporate. Pumping is expensive,l83 however, 
and many legislators found it difficult to support a plan that called 
for wasting water in traditionally arid Utah. l84 Private lobbying 
focused on more radical plans, such as a complicated inter-island 
diking scheme that would have created a profitable fresh-water bay 
at one end of the lake. 185 Policymakers did not entertain seriously 
the idea of using the unimplemented comprehensive plan for the 
lake's management; in their minds, the decision was between inaction 
and an array of expensive flood mitigation programs. 
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In 1985, the Utah Division of Comprehensive Emergency Man-
agement designated the Great Salt Lake's shoreland as a Beneficial 
Development Area (BDA) where development would be restricted; 
local governments, however, would not cooperate in implementing 
the BDA concept on a large scale. 186 Several highly developed coun-
ties, such as Davis County near Salt Lake City, opposed the plan on 
the grounds that it would result in a loss of local control over zoning 
and could jeopardize very profitable shorefront developments. 187 
Other counties, such as Weaver County, did adopt setback rules on 
their own, but now are considering dropping these rules as lake 
levels fall again. 188 
In 1986, the state began large-scale funding for flood mitigation. 
It ultimately spent about $60 million to construct a water pumping 
project that pumped the lake's excess water to the Nevada desert. 
The pumping continued in full force until lake levels began to recede 
in 1987. 189 
During the high-water period, property owners did not push the 
state to compensate them for loss of property due to flooding. Most 
of the damage was to industry or infrastructure, and the state did 
not want to set a precedent by offering compensation. Interestingly, 
there appears to have been no attempt to sue the state for compen-
sation using the argument that the statute had mandated the lake 
be maintained at the 4202-foot level. l90 
At the present time, there is almost no effort in Utah to plan for 
future lake-level fluctuations. Because local governments are wary 
of losing profitable shoreline development, and the state is not taking 
a stand on the issue, the lessons presented by hundreds of millions 
of dollars of flood damage have been ignored. Flood mitigation proj-
ects, such as the water pumping system, are still in place and provide 
an expensive, publicly funded safety net for shorefront residents and 
development interests alike. With the current drought in the area 
and falling lake levels, Utah's citizens seem to have forgotten that 
lake levels will continue to fluctuate dramatically in the future. 
The Utah experience indicates that any attempt to restrict coastal 
development in order to permit coastal wetlands migration must 
begin with a campaign to educate residents and local officials on the 
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187 Telephone Interview with Peter Morrisette, Fellow, Resources for the Future (Feb. 23, 
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hazards of sea level rise. Following this education effort must be the 
promulgation and implementation of a comprehensive plan to control 
coastal development in a manner that will allow for a gradual retreat 
in the face of an unrelenting rise in sea level. 
B. Michigan 
In contrast to Utah, Michigan responded to rising Great Lakes 
levels with a program that provided for an orderly retreat from the 
shoreline. Michigan borders on four of the five Great Lakes and has 
witnessed significant lake-level fluctuations several times during this 
century.191 In 1985, the lakes began to rise again, this time more 
dramatically than in the past.192 The governor and the state legis-
lature responded quickly and unanimously by creating the Emer-
gency Home Moving Program (EHMP), an innovative pilot program 
to provide loan interest subsidies for the relocation of erosion-threat-
ened houses. 193 These subsidies covered the costs of moving houses, 
septic systems, water lines, and electric cables, and of demolishing 
and removing houses that would not survive a move inland. l94 Mich-
igan's experience demonstrates the value of adopting a regulatory 
strategy based upon the concept of presumed mobility. 
The EHMP, which the Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) administered, offered eligible homeowners two options for 
receiving a relocation subsidy. One option was to take out a loan 
from a public lending institution and then apply to the DNR for a 
three-percent interest rate subsidy on the first $25,000 in costS. 195 
The other option was to accept a one-time payment directly from 
the DNR of up to $3500 to defray the costs of relocation. 196 To meet 
the conditions for the subsidy, a homeowner was required to move 
its building at least forty-five feet inland. 197 A counterpart to the 
EHMP, the Emergency Home Flood Protection Program, provided 
subsidies for the elevation of endangered buildings. 198 This program 
specifically excluded permanent structures such as seawalls and 
dikes. 199 
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The legislature appropriated $2,000,000 for the EHMP in 1986 and 
reauthorized it for $1,000,000 in 1987. All funds were designated for 
subsidies, with staff costs absorbed by the DNR's Coast Zone Man-
agement office. Between August 1986 and February 1987, the DNR 
received 273 applications, of which it accepted 199 as eligible for the 
program.2OO It paid out subsidies totalling $267,000 to seventy-two 
people, sixty-four for relocation and eight for shoreline protection.201 
Michigan did not renew the EHMP after lake levels began to fall 
in 1987, and there are no plans to reactivate the program in the near 
future. DNR attributes some of the success of the program to its 
keeping paperwork to a minimum; the agency processed applications 
over the telephone and developed one-page forms for both applicants 
and banks.202 The agency found that direct subsidies to homeowners 
were preferable to interest subsidies, because the latter discrimi-
nated against poorer homeowners who could not qualify for loans. 203 
One commentator, however, recently noted some of the weak-
nesses of the EHMP.204 First, the program presupposed that prop-
erty owners had either land on which to relocate or sufficient capital 
to buy new land. Second, the program probably did not appear 
attractive to owners of buildings that were too large or structurally 
weak to relocate; their only option was demolition.205 The commen-
tator did point out that the estimated $36,000 relocation cost per 
building was much less than the cost of rebuilding. 206 
It appears that the success of a program like Michigan's EHMP 
depends on the ability of an administering agency to convince shore-
line property owners of an imminent hazard, and on the payment of 
a subsidy large enough to make relocation the most attractive option. 
This type of subsidy could be established on either the federal or 
state level for the owners of property in upland areas that are 
threatened by sea level rise and have been deemed suitable for 
wetlands migration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While there are many uncertainties associated with coastal wet-
lands migration, one fact is certain: a community that can develop a 
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detailed, workable plan for dealing with the consequences of sea 
level rise will emerge with more successful solutions than a com-
munity that must improvise when a crisis arises. The case studies 
detailed above demonstrate the values that public education, re-
search, government commitment, and advance planning hold for any 
effort to enable the migration of coastal wetlands. Moreover, the 
case studies illustrate the advantages of institutionalizing the con-
cept of presumed mobility. By enacting legislation and promulgating 
regulations that provide for an orderly retreat from the coastline 
over time, property owners can be psychologically and financially 
prepared to retreat before migrating wetlands conditions reach their 
doorsteps. 
